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Abstract 
By gathering a representative sample of citizens from all 27 EU Member States, the 
deliberative poll Europolis created the opportunity for the inclusion of a wide variety of 
European voices. Taking up claims of difference democrats who argue that informal hurdles 
to participation can endure even after individuals gain formal access to the floor, this article 
argues for an extended approach to evaluate equality in deliberative minipublics. Specifically, 
it assesses whether participants contributed in roughly equal measures to the discussion and 
whether their discussion partners considered their contributions on equal merits. In doing so, 
the article adds to the small but growing literature on deliberation that expresses reservations 
about taking the willingness to engage with others' claims for granted. In order to account for 
the intrinsically relational aspect of interpersonal communication, measures of social network 
analysis are introduced as possible tools to evaluate participation equality in deliberative 
encounters. 
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Recent years have witnessed a strong surge in existing mini-publics. The aim of such 
artificially created forums for small-scale public deliberation is to create ‘more perfect public 
spheres’ (Fung, 2003, p. 338), or ‘safe havens, that are insulated from certain negative or 
distorting effects’ (Chambers, 2004, p. 400). In this regard, mini-publics are often thought of 
as educative forums that allow room for a variety of views and perspectives to be expressed 
and seriously considered (Fung, 2003). Among these attempts, the deliberative poll (DP) 
developed by James Fishkin (1995) represents the gold standard in many respects, among 
other things in terms of representativeness (Mansbridge, 2010). By means of random 
sampling, DP attempts to create equal chances for everyone to be selected and to influence the 
decision process (Fishkin and Lustkin, 2005). Up to now, evaluations of political equality in 
DP have largely focused on the questions of whether the sample of deliberators was 
representative of a broader public (e.g. Andersen and Hansen, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002) and 
whether post-deliberative opinions were dominated by the view of a particular social group 
(e.g., Fishkin et al., 2010; Luskin et al., 2013).  
Less is known, however, about the degree to which participants actually gained equal 
standing in the process of deliberation itself (see Hansen, 2010; Siu, 2009 for exceptions). 
This is a substantial shortcoming for at least two reasons. First, while offering everyone equal 
possibilities to participate in mini-public events is essential, it is in itself not a sufficient 
condition to establish equal participation (e.g., Cohen, 1989; Fraser, 1992; Young, 2002). 
Critics argue that informal hurdles to participation can persist even after individuals gain 
formal access to the floor. However, organizers of mini-publics such as the DP mitigate this 
concern by emphasizing that mini-public designs incorporate many procedural safeguards: the 
introduction of trained facilitators and specific rules for discussion should ensure that 
deliberation proceeds in a fair and equal way (e.g., Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). Yet, it is 
surprising how little the role of the facilitators has been theorized in the framework of 
deliberation, given the essential part that is attributed to facilitators in establishing an 
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inclusive atmosphere for discussion (Smith, 2009, pp. 162-193; see Moore, 2012 for an 
exception). It comes as no surprise that the lack of theorization echoes in largely mixed results 
on facilitators’ behavior and their potential influence on establishing a balanced atmosphere 
for discussion (e.g., Ryfe, 2006; Schneiderhan and Khan, 2008; Stromer-Galley, 2007; but see 
Trénel, 2010). Thus, an evaluation of deliberative participation that only focuses on formal 
access to deliberation may be insufficient. Second, estimating whether post-deliberative 
opinions are strongly influenced by a particular social group may not give a full account of 
whether participants were substantively equal in deliberation. Of course, confirming that 
disadvantaged groups were not forced to conform to the views of a dominant group by 
underlying power structures is a positive sign of deliberative inclusion. Yet, an outcome-
oriented approach to participation equality might be too quick in assuming that serious 
reflection of others’ arguments automatically manifests in opinion shift (Dobson, 2012, p. 
844; see Barabas, 2004). In other words, whether others’ thoughts manage to change one’s 
opinion is, ideally, more a question of the force of the better argument than of the actual 
willingness to seriously consider others’ claims in the light of one’s own (Mansbridge, 1999, 
p. 225).  
This article adds another layer to the literature on inclusiveness of deliberative mini-publics 
by analyzing participation equality in the process of deliberation itself. Specifically, the article 
argues in favor of two additional dimensions of substantive participation equality that are 
regarded as crucial preconditions to creating more informed and considered opinions. I dub 
them equal contribution and equal consideration. From such a perspective, I address the 
questions of the extent to which individuals participated at equal levels and whether their 
arguments were considered on equal merits. I propose multilevel modeling and social network 
analysis as possible methodological tools to address these questions. A subsample of small 
group discussions on third country migration that have been conducted in the framework of a 
pan-European deliberative poll (Europolis) serves as an empirical example. 
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section contains the theoretical 
discussion on equal opportunities to influence the deliberative process and embeds the 
argument in deliberative theory. The third section presents the case study, details the 
statistical methodologies at use and displays information on the choice of variables. 
Subsequently, I present the main results and discuss the implications of the findings. The last 
section concludes and offers suggestions for future research.  
Participation Equality in the Deliberative Process 
From an epistemic point of view, deliberation is desirable because it holds the potential for 
incorporating a wide array of different perspectives (e.g., Bohman, 2006; Estlund, 1997; 
Mansbridge et al., 2012). By gathering a random sample of a given population, DP possesses 
the potential to expose participants to a wide range of facts and moral positions which may 
render individuals more considerate, further tolerance and may even reduce prejudice (Mutz, 
2006). Although random sampling methods as utilized in DP may succeed in gathering a 
representative sample of a broader public and therefore fulfill a necessary condition for equal 
participation, they are in themselves not sufficient.
1
 Cohen (1989, pp. 22-23) states that not 
only do individuals need to be formally empowered to participate in deliberation, they also 
need to be substantively equal ‘in that the existing distribution of power and resources does 
not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that contribution play an 
authoritative role in their deliberation’ (see also Young 2002). In this sense, ‘deliberation 
depends on achieving an important kind of equality, equality as a partner in a dialogue’ 
(Warren 2001, p. 81). Only a focus on the process of deliberation allows for testing whether 
this kind of equality has been reached. 
During deliberation itself, equality could potentially be violated in two consecutive 
dimensions. First, some participants might not express themselves at appropriate length 
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compared to some of their co-discussants which could result in domination of some 
perspectives over others or even worse, in non-communication of a particular perspective 
(Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002). Second, a speaker’s opportunity to influence the political 
process is determined not only by the action of the speaker herself but also by the listeners’ 
willingness to take the speaker’s claim into account (Knight and Johnson, 1997; see also 
Bohman, 1997).  
Note that Bohman makes an important distinction between being able to influence the process 
of deliberation and the ability to influence the outcome of deliberation (or, the ability to 
effectively influence the deliberative process) (see also Estlund, 2000). While the former 
requires active communication of one’s central claims and others’ willingness to weigh the 
merits of each claim on equal grounds, the latter additionally requires one’s ability to 
convince others by superiority of reasoning. The scope of this article is limited to the former. 
The following two subsections will elaborate on the two dimensions of equality that are of 
relevance during the process of deliberation. In the following, I refer to them as equal 
contribution and equal consideration.  
Equal Contribution 
Sure, the deliberative ideal of equal participation does not demand that everyone participates 
with equal numbers of words (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 232). However, equal participation 
requires that no person or particular group completely dominates the discussion, even though 
deliberators may differ in power and prestige (Thompson, 2008, p. 501). Patterns of 
dominance in discussion would have consequential framing and agenda-setting effects and 
preclude people from basing their judgments on the entire pool of relevant reasons (see e.g., 
Mendelberg, 2002).  
Several scholars express reservations when it comes to the practicability of equal contribution 
(e.g., Benhabib, 1996; Sanders, 1997; Young, 2000). This is based on the fact that these 
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critics attribute a calm and dispassionate style of expression to middle- and upper-class white 
men, while they view the emotive and physically demonstrative modes of expression to be 
strongly associated with women and cultural minorities. As a consequence, Young (2002) 
fears that historically oppressed segments of the population do not dare to speak, as they do 
not consider themselves able to fulfill the requirement of rational discourse (see Mansbridge, 
1983). Yet some researchers would contest the concerns related to gender by arguing that 
women are particularly prone to deliberation, in that they pursue a kinder and gentler style of 
politics (Childs, 2004; Norris, 1996). Moreover, Neblo et al. (2010) provide convincing 
evidence that groups that normally display reluctance towards traditional means of political 
participation are actually more willing to participate in deliberation. Hoping to get a better 
hearing of their claims, these groups might view deliberation as a valuable alternative to 
‘politics as usual’. Whether mini-publics manage to activate disadvantaged groups to a 
substantial degree is still an open question and the few studies that addressed this subject so 
far in the context of DP provide mixed evidence. Concerning face-to-face-deliberation, 
Hansen (2010) detects equality biases for gender, education and age in discussions on the 
single European currency as conducted in the 2000 Danish DP. Similar results are obtained 
from another deliberative face-to-face encounter on building an additional nuclear power 
plant in Finland (Himmelroos, 2011). On the other hand, results from online Deliberative 
Polls on the 2004 Presidential nomination campaigns and the 2005 online Poll on health care 
and education did not detect such biases (Siu, 2009). So far, these results are in line with Price 
(2009, p. 43), arguing that more anonymous deliberative settings may reduce patterns of 
social dominance. 
Equal Consideration  
By filtering incoming information in a biased way, deliberators may infringe another form of 
equality. For deliberation to reach its full epistemic potential, post-deliberative preferences 
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and decisions need to be based on facts and logic and be the outcome of ‘substantive and 
meaningful consideration of relevant reasons’ (Mansbridge et al., 2012, p. 11). In order for 
relevant reasons to enter the opinion formation process, deliberators’ claims need to be 
listened to seriously (Bickford, 1996; Dobson, 2010). However, deliberative researchers often 
ignore the importance of listening in that they often (and against all evidence) assume that 
incoming information is processed in a uniform way (Dobson, 2012; Lupia, 2002; 
Mendelberg, 2002). From a viewpoint of equal opportunities to influence the deliberative 
process, however, it is essential that everyone be recognized as equal discussant with 
legitimate claims (e.g., Bohman, 1997; Knight and Johnson, 1997). Moreover, a demanding 
understanding of equal consideration requires recognition to go beyond the mere and rather 
passive act of listening to what others have to say. As Bickford (1996, pp. 153-159) succinctly 
puts it, silence may either be an indicator of attentive listening or a non-verbal refusal to 
engage with what others have said. In other words, deliberation requires uptake of and 
engagement with others’ claims, so that people respond to claims ‘as issues – that is, as 
matters that deserve response in their own terms’ (Warren 2001, p. 81; see also Goodin, 2000, 
Knight and Johnson, 1997; Pedrini et al., 2013). The very interactive moment of reciprocal 
recognition is also embodied in Gutmann and Thompson’s (1996, p. 79) definition of mutual 
respect, which demands a ‘favorable attitude toward, and constructive interaction with, the 
persons with whom one disagrees’. According to the authors, a listener’s willingness to treat a 
speaker with respect also demonstrates his commitment for self-reflection and openness to 
preference change. And it is only to the extent that the listener actively responds to what a 
speaker has said that everyone, including the speaker, is able to reflect on public deliberation 
(see Christiano, 2008, p. 201). 
Again, critics question the direct applicability of such a deliberative ideal to real-world 
deliberation. One argument is that dominant groups may, even unconsciously, treat claims of 
people from traditionally disadvantaged groups with inadequate respect (Sanders, 1997; 
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Young, 2002). If true, this would dispel many of the benefits accredited to deliberation: ‘when 
this happens, democratic theory doesn’t have an answer, because one cannot counter a 
pernicious group dynamic with a good reason’ (Sanders, 1997, p. 354). Adequate 
consideration of others’ views may also be more difficult to achieve when the group increases 
in heterogeneity. By bringing together people with different cultural backgrounds, more time 
and energy might be required in order to appropriately consider the full variety of speaking 
and reasoning styles (Benhabib, 2002; Burkhalter, 2002). The well-known insights provided 
by the interracial town meetings on school desegregation amplify some of these concerns 
(Mendelberg and Oleske, 2000). On the other hand, more optimistic conclusions are drawn 
when it comes to the uptake of claims from language minorities’ in the Swiss parliament 
(Pedrini et al., 2013). Beyond these valuable insights, we lack empirical observations on the 
practicability of equal consideration. This is also true for DP, although Fishkin (2009, p. 160) 
admits that the degree to which equal consideration is realized cannot be prescribed by 
institutional design. In the transnational environment of Europolis, the viability of equal 
consideration may particularly be endangered by the fact that people enter the discussion with 
a variety of cultural backgrounds and experiences in the field of EU-politics and the topic of 
immigration (e.g., Geddes, 2003).  
Data and Measurement 
Case Study (Europolis) 
I assess the degree of participation equality in the deliberative process on the basis of face-to-
face small group discussions on third country immigration to the EU, as conducted in a 
transnational deliberative poll (Europolis) which took place in Brussels in May 2009. By 
gathering a representative sample of the European population for deliberation, Europolis 
created a favorable environment for EU-citizens of all 27 member states to become 
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substantially more informed about politics (Fishkin, 2009, pp. 159-195). Following standard 
practice of DP, Europolis incorporated pre- and post-questionnaires, the provision of balanced 
briefing material in the forefront of the event, as well as the possibility to discuss important 
issues in a plenary with experts and politicians. During the three-day event, about 350 
participants from all 27 EU-member states discussed in 25 small groups of 11 to 16 
participants the topics of third country migration and climate change. The groups were created 
by random variations of the languages spoken, which resulted in including participants from 
two to five different nationalities per group. The small groups were moderated by trained 
facilitators whose task was to keep discussion open and balanced, and the speeches provided 
were simultaneously translated in all languages spoken in the group. Due to limitations in 
simultaneous translation, national heterogeneity of Europolis small group compositions varied 
to a considerable degree: while some groups encompassed a wide variety of nationalities, in 
others it merely came down to a discussion among neighbors. Therefore, the Europolis project 
presents an interesting case for analyzing small group deliberation with varying degrees of 
European diversity. 
For demonstrating purposes, I refrained from analyzing all 25 small group discussions. 
Rather, I took a subsample of 13 groups and limited the analysis to the general discussion on 
immigration and the more specific discussion on policy options that address third country 
migration. Although the selected subsample is limited in scope with regard to EU member 
states, it is comparable to the rest of the sample with regard to important socio-demographic 
and motivational variables.
 
Despite its limitations concerning the representation of different 
nationalities, the sample consists of groups that show notable variation in national 
heterogeneity (see Appendix).  
Assessing Equality of Contribution 
 10 
Since there is no universal agreement on how to capture contribution, a double-track approach 
is pursued. A participant’s contribution is captured via the amount of speaking time (in 
seconds) and the frequency of contribution (Bächtiger et al., 2010b). Linear multilevel models 
are estimated for the logarithm of speaking time since the distribution of speaking time is 
strongly skewed to the left and ranges from 0 to 1593 seconds (26.5 minutes) of speaking 
time in a total of approximately 1.5 hours of discussion time.
2
 Random slopes instead of 
random intercept models are estimated since overall speaking time was roughly equal in all 
groups. The slopes for participants of EU-members that joined the EU in 2004 or later were 
allowed to vary. The underlying assumption is that members of new EU-countries show a 
more balanced participation behavior if they discuss only among themselves. The distribution 
of frequency is also strongly skewed to the left, ranging from 0 to a total of 21 delivered 
speeches. Here, Poisson models for count data were estimated. In order to account for 
overdispersion, Poisson lognormal models are estimated by adding an individual-level 
random effect to the models estimated with lme4 (Bates et al., 2011; Bolker, 2010).  
Assessing Equality of Consideration 
Consideration is based on the updated DQI indicator of respect towards other participants’ 
arguments (Bächtiger et al., 2010b; see Steiner et al., 2004). The DQI indicator captures 
interactivity, or the uptake of arguments, in assessing whether speakers explicitly referred to 
others’ arguments in a disrespectful, neutral or respectful manner or whether they ignored 
other participants’ statements. Given the explanations above, I regard a view to be explicitly 
considered if someone directly addresses a previous speaker in response to something he had 
said. In a first step, interactive instances have been coded from the transcripts of the group 
discussions. An inter-coder reliability test by three independent coders showed respectable 
levels of agreement on the coding.
3
 By assessing the nature of the reference as well as the 
sender and the receiver of a reference, a matrix of argumentative uptake can be created 
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(Pedrini et al., 2013). This presents the basis for further analysis. In this paper, I focus on 
explicitly neutral or positive references and subsume them under the category of ‘civil 
references’. I ignore disrespectful references, since they violate the fundamental notion of 
constructive interaction (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996; Mansbridge et al., 2012).
4
 
Moreover, instances of disrespect were rare in Europolis. This is not surprising given that in 
DP, stakes are low and participants are encouraged to meet others with respect (Fung, 2003). 
In order to retrieve the measure for consideration, I rely on network measures. Since 
deliberation is a communicative act and an ‘individual functions as a part of the group and 
each influences the other’ (Mendelberg, 2005, p. 645), social network analysis may help to 
capture elements of deliberative inclusion. With a few exceptions, network structures of 
deliberative discussions remain largely unexplored (but see Cinalli and O’Flynn, 2013; 
Pedrini et al., 2013). For this purpose, an actor’s centrality has been calculated from the 
matrix. Centrality measures capture an actor’s connectedness to a set of other actors and are 
commonly viewed as an indicator of an actor’s power within the network (Krackhardt 1990). 
In deliberative discussions, an actor’s power may be determined by the degree to which his 
views have been taken up by his co-discussants. In order to evaluate whether participants’ 
claims have received equal consideration, the dependent variable will be operationalized as a 
measure of consideration centrality. For this purpose, I focus on in-degree relations, i.e. the 
amount of references that a participant receives. Concretely, the network centrality measure 
encompasses the total number of co-discussants that made a civil reference to a speaker at 
least once. In the Europolis subsample, in-degree centrality ranges from 0 (a person spoke but 
has never been referenced) to 10 (a person was referenced by 10 different co-discussants at 
least once).
5
 Since the distribution is strongly skewed to the left, lognormal Poisson models 
are estimated (see above).  
In order to explore consideration structures a bit further, network measures of homophily 
(McPherson et al., 2001) may be of particular relevance. An empirical approach to equal 
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consideration not only requires that claims are taken up, but also that the claims of some 
groups have been considered by other groups (Pedrini et al., 2013). In this sense, homophily 
analysis may serve as an important complement to the analysis of consideration centrality. 
Homophily is defined as the tendency for similar individuals to form a relation (McPherson et 
al., 2001; see Lazer et al., 2011). Translated to the deliberative setting, homophily allows for 
testing whether members of a dominant group remained sufficiently open to claims raised by 
more peripheral actors or whether they preferred to engage with dominant others and thus 
contributed to the monopolization of the discussion.  
 
Predictor Variables 
In order to test whether different perspectives were appropriately aired and considered, I 
include the following variables of interest in the model that were captured by the pre-
deliberative Europolis questionnaire (see Appendix for more detailed information on the 
operationalization):  
In terms of socio-demographics, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) detect a general increase in 
immigrant support with higher educational and skill levels when analyzing data from the 
European Social Survey 2003 (ESS). Using data on the ESS conducted in 2004/05, Masso 
(2009) also identifies a general tendency for younger people towards openness to cultural 
diversity and thus readiness to accept immigrants (see also Hanmueller and Hiscox, 2007). 
Similarly, gender effects were located. However, they disappear when controls for values 
such as tolerance and the importance for traditions and cultures are introduced in the model 
(Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007, p. 432) but this also nourishes the view of the caring and 
empathetic woman (Norris, 1996). For all these reasons, a binary variable for gender, taking 
in the value (1) for women and (0) for men; another binary variable indicating whether a 
person feels that she belongs to the working-class (1) or to the middle or upper class (0); a 
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variable for education, measured in years of age when the education ended; and a categorical 
variable for age, classifying a person into being young (18-34 years old), intermediate (35-64 
years old) or older (65 and above). The categorization of age was undertaken because 
previous findings suggest a non-linear effect for age, with the group of middle aged 
discussants being the most active (Hansen, 2010; Himmelroos, 2011).  
In order to account for attitudinal diversity in positions towards immigration and potential 
policies, a categorical variable is introduced that tabs whether a person’s attitude on 
immigration is conservative, progressive, or moderate. Originally, this variable has been built 
as a scale from five central questions on immigration as posed in the Europolis pre-
deliberative questionnaire. They proved to be substantially related in a test of inter-item 
correlation (α=0.76). Subsequently and following the same logic as for age, the upper and the 
lower 25 percent quantile of the scale were classified as progressive and conservative, 
respectively. The 50 percent in-between were considered to hold moderate attitudes on the 
issue. 
Two additional variables were introduced in order to account for the impact of national 
diversity. At the individual level, an additional categorical variable distinguishes between 
people belonging to a Western European (0), a Southern European (1) or a Central Eastern 
European state that joined the EU in 2004 or later (2). Of course, this presents an over-
simplification in terms of existing diversities in national immigration policies as well as 
experiences with immigration (see Papadopoulus 2012). However, such a typology can be 
based on economic, geopolitical, historical and geographical considerations (see, e.g., 
Geddes, 2003, Hainmüller and Hiscox, 2007).
6
 At the group level, a measure was created to 
capture the degree of national heterogeneity that was present within the groups. The measure 
is based on a weighed version of the Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF) (see 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003).
7
 The idea for introducing such a group level variable stems from 
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literature on multiculturalism, arguing that deliberation among people with different cultural 
backgrounds needs more time to encompass a wide variety of experiences and perspectives 
(see above). This might particularly be true when deliberating on an issue that lies at the core 
of the nation state, such as immigration and incorporation (Benhabib 2002). 
Additional individual level factors are introduced as controls. All of them are expected to 
enhance an individual’s motivation and thus engagement in discussion (see, e.g., Neblo et al., 
2010). These are: interest in politics, an indicator for salience that aims to capture the personal 
relevance of the topic and an indicator for knowledge on immigration. All variables are 
detailed in the Appendix.
8
  
Results 
In a first step, multilevel models for contribution were estimated. Model 1 in Table 1 presents 
the results of the lognormal Poisson models for frequency of participation. Belonging to a 
Central Eastern European (CEE) member state is supposed to reduce participation by 30% of 
the expected count. A strong reduction is also suggested for members of the working-class (-
23%). However, there is still a considerable degree of statistical uncertainty in the latter two 
estimates (p<0.1). Yet, the picture looks somewhat different when focusing on speaking time, 
the second indicator of contribution equality (Model 2, Table 1). Exponentiating the estimate 
for women shows that the significant reduction in speaking time is considerable (-48.5%), 
holding all other factors constant. Even higher is the estimated reduction in speaking time for 
participants from CEE states (-54.3%), although the effect slightly misses the level of 
marginal significance (p<0.1). While working-class participants are biased when it comes to 
frequency of speaking, there is no significant evidence that this bias translates to the amount 
of speaking time. In both models, no bias is detected for age, education, gender and attitudes 
towards migration. When turning to the control variables, interest in politics is a clear driver 
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of contribution, both in terms of utterances and total amount of speaking. Furthermore, 
knowledge excerts a significant and substantial effect on speaking time. 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
One fear of deliberative critics is that participation biases increase with the heterogeneity of 
the discussion environment (e.g., Karpowitz et al., 2009). Empirically, this is most 
pronounced for women and participants from new EU-member countries.
9
 Figure 1 displays 
the marginal effect of gender and CEE participants on contribution by varying degrees of 
national heterogeneity. The effects are based on the Models in Table 1 but incorporate an 
additional cross-level interaction term.
10
 Again, the bias is more pronounced for the models of 
speaking time while the effect for frequency of contribution does not reach sufficient levels of 
statistical significance. In terms of speaking time, women’s effect on contribution was 
significantly and substantially different from zero in the nine most heterogeneous discussion 
groups, while the gender gap is smaller and less certain in the more homogeneous groups. 
More worrisome is the picture for participants from new EU-member countries. The shaded 
area demarcates the location of the groups in which participants of the new CEE member 
states were engaging with participants from older EU-member states (Western, Southern, or 
both). From a perspective of European integration, the results are somewhat troubling: when 
engaging with participants from older EU-countries, the newcomers are very likely to add 
significantly less to the discussion.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In the Danish deliberative poll, Hansen (2010) concludes that the gender gap is particularly 
pronounced among the least active participants. The findings are similar in Europolis: If we 
exclude participants from the model that did not speak at all (N=11) the effect size for women 
on contribution in terms of speaking time decreases substantially. The effect, however, 
remains significant. On the other hand, the effects for working-class participants increases 
 16 
both in magnitude and clarity (see Table 2). Among the ones who spoke, working-class 
participants seem to be the ones with the smallest amount of contribution. These results are 
important to keep in mind when turning to the consideration models, since actual contribution 
is a necessary precondition for receiving consideration.  
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Let us now turn to the determinants of consideration (Table 2, Model 5). In terms of biases for 
our marginalized groups, the consideration model seems to be somewhat a reflection of the 
frequency model for speakers presented in the same table (Model 4), indicating that the ones 
who spoke more often were also the ones whose views were considered more often by 
others.
11
 With a value of 0.73, the bivariate correlation between consideration centrality and 
frequency of speaking is indeed considerable. According to the estimates, being a member of 
the working-class accounts for a 39% decrease in receiving consideration. For women and 
new EU-members, results look more promising: while there are some inequalities in terms of 
contribution among participants of these groups, there is no concrete evidence for their 
marginalization in terms of consideration. On the other hand, more conservative attitudes on 
immigration received somewhat more consideration than one would have expected from their 
level of contribution. Such an effect does not exist for participants holding progressive 
attitudes. 
Again, interaction models for gender and CEE participants were estimated. Figure 2 plots the 
marginal effects for gender and CEE members on receiving consideration. There is no 
concrete evidence that new EU-members received significantly less consideration than their 
older European peers. Yet, the confidence intervals for women in the most heterogeneous 
groups are different from 0, suggesting that women receive significantly less consideration 
when they engage in highly heterogeneous groups.  
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 17 
Previous results render slightly optimistic in suggesting that marginalized groups in terms of 
speaking nevertheless managed to gain themselves an ear – at least roughly to the degree they 
contributed to the discussion. In a next step, however, we may also want to know whether 
arguments of the more peripheral groups have been fairly considered by members of the 
dominant group (see Pedrini et al., 2013). Discovering that views of marginalized group 
members only found appropriate consideration among members of the peripheral groups 
would reveal the previous optimism as too hasty. Therefore, we turn to the question of 
homophily. Homophily analysis explores whether individuals’ views were more likely to be 
considered by similar others. While the absence of homophily would suggest that the claims 
of peripheral groups reasonably entered the consideration process of members of the 
dominating groups, evidence of homophily might imply that exclusionary mechanisms were 
at work. I test for homophily by comparing network densities of the consideration networks 
between peripheral and dominant groups (see Lazer et al., 2010). Network densities are 
calculated as the total number of existing relations (here: references) over the total number of 
possible relations. Densities can take in any number between 0 (here: indicating that no one’s 
view was referenced) and 1 (indicating that everyone’s view was referred to by all members 
of the group). Figure 3 displays the percentage point differences in within- and between-group 
densities (for exact figures, see Appendix, Table A.5 to A.7). Positive numbers indicate a 
tendency for homophily (more references were made to in-group members), while numbers 
below zero indicate a tendency toward heterophily (more references were made to out-group 
members). While the triangles display the differences in densities for the more dominant 
cohorts (separately, for each small group discussion), the circles show the same from the 
perspective of the marginalized groups.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Figure 3 reveals an overall tendency toward homophily for men, non-working-class 
participants and citizens of older EU-countries: the dominating groups in terms of 
contribution tend to consider views from their peers more often than views of their more 
peripheral discussion partners. Yet the extent to which they do that varies greatly from group 
to group. For example, while in three groups, participants from older EU-countries were 
equally likely to interact with participants from CEE countries as with their peers, another 
group shows a 50 percentage point difference in favor of referencing their dominant peers. As 
an illustration, Figure 4 graphs the consideration network of the latter group.  
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Turning to the marginalized groups (circles), the reverse picture is on display. In the large 
majority of the group discussions, women, working-class participants and members from new 
EU-countries showed higher consideration densities towards members of the dominant out-
group. Yet there are two notable exceptions for gender: in two comparatively homogeneous 
groups (group 3, WE members only; group 16, CEE members only), women received more 
references from both male and female participants.  
Additional analyses show that in 8 out of 13 groups (11, respectively), women and working-
class participants received, in absolute terms more reference from the central actors than from 
members of the peripheral groups. Thus, the fact that marginalized groups received somewhat 
less consideration compared to their dominating counterparts is not necessarily due to a lack 
of interest from the side of the central groups. Rather, marginalized actors seem to contribute 
to the preservation of their peripheral position by considering the arguments of the 
dominating speakers as more valuable. Figure 5 illustrates such a situation in group 1. 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Discussion and Implications 
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The results as described in the previous section allow for optimistic as well as pessimistic 
considerations. At this point, however, we may only speculate on the reasons for the detected 
patterns of dominance.  
Concerning inequalities in contribution, one may argue that, in terms of epistemic quality, the 
contributions of members of the less active groups may not have lived up to the contributions 
provided by the dominant speakers. Recognizing other actors to be the more eloquent 
advocates may have intimidated some actors from contribution and it might explain why the 
formers’ views were more likely to find consideration.12 However, deliberative theory would 
meet such an approach to equal opportunities with reticence. A priori denying a particular 
social perspective or non-rational styles of communication from exerting political influence 
would be counterproductive to the goal of deliberative inclusion (e.g., Bohman, 2006; Cohen, 
1989, p. 30). Furthermore, by enlarging the pool of admissible forms of deliberative 
communication such as rhetoric or storytelling, deliberative theory recently leveled the 
requirement for rational discourse, which gave pause to theorists calling for equal reasoning 
capacities (e.g., Bächtiger et al., 2010a; Dryzek, 2000). 
Finding that consideration patterns are largely a reflection of the patterns for frequency of 
contribution recalls Sanders’ (1997) meta-analysis of jury studies. Sanders (1997, p. 365) 
concludes that whether an argument prevails during deliberation is a matter of whether the 
argument has a ‘talkative promoter’. A promising (though tentative) conclusion would be that 
by enhancing contribution equality, consideration biases could be attenuated. On the other 
hand, offering ‘overspeaking’ as a panacea to recognition may leave us with an uneasy 
feeling: a participant that only contributed once may offer a novel perspective or introduce 
critical remarks, while a participant that ‘overspeaks’ may add little to the discussion if he 
only repeats the same arguments several times. Nevertheless, if equal consideration 
automatically follows from equal contribution, purposive mechanisms of exclusion would be 
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absent and all that would be needed is boosting the self-confidence of traditionally 
marginalized groups in order for them to participate at equal length.  
From a practical point of view, however, one may question how participation equality could 
be enhanced further, given that DP already places so much emphasis on providing a favorable 
environment for free and equal participation. In DP, a crucial role is attributed to the neutral 
and well-trained facilitators that should be able to mitigate various kinds of inequalities (e.g., 
Fishkin and Luskin, 2005). To the extent that mini-public designs such as DP represent ‘more 
perfect public spheres’ (Fung, 2003, pg. 338), one may wonder whether detected inequalities 
such as the effect for working-class participants are more of a structural nature. In this regard, 
psychological literature would speak of a phenomenon called ‘outgroup favoritism’ where 
low-status groups favor high-status groups and thus add to a ‘manifestation of the tendency to 
internalize and thus perpetuate the system of inequality’ (Jost et al., 2004, p. 891).  
Yet, a deliberative theory of facilitation has hitherto been missing (but see Moore, 2012), and 
facilitator intervention varied across Europolis group discussions (reference withheld). 
Whether and how facilitators manage to establish a fair and equal discussion atmosphere are 
important issues for future research. In this regard, future researchers should also pay more 
attention to group dynamics and social psychological mechanisms in order to contribute to a 
richer understanding of participation patterns in deliberative mini-publics.  
Conclusion 
In this article, I have proposed a pathway to evaluate equal participation during small group 
discussions in deliberative polling (DP). The main motivation for doing so is that informal 
impediments to participation may remain even after everyone is formally empowered to take 
part (e.g., Fraser, 1992; Sanders, 1997; Young, 2002). By accounting for the intrinsically 
relational aspect of interpersonal communication, the paper adds to the small but growing 
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literature on deliberation that voices reservations about taking the willingness to engage with 
others claims for granted (e.g., Burkhalter, 2002; Dobson 2010, 2012; Stromer-Galley, 2007; 
Pedrini et al., 2013). Methodologically, the article responds to Mendelberg (2005) who argues 
for taking the deliberative context more seriously. As a consequence, multilevel modeling and 
social network analysis have been proposed as suitable tools of analysis.  
In terms of contribution, the findings reveal that particularly women, members of new EU-
countries and working-class participants spoke significantly and substantially less than their 
counterparts. Most importantly, results suggest a contextual effect on contribution: with 
increasing diversity of national backgrounds, women and new EU-members tend to give the 
floor to men and members of older EU-states. Yet the effects are more attenuated for the 
absolute amount of speaking time, while they are nuanced for the number of speeches made 
by individuals. When it comes to patterns of consideration, the article is far from concluding 
that the dominating groups purposely excluded the views of more peripheral actors. Rather, 
results suggest that the degree to which a speaker receives consideration from others largely 
depends on the number of speeches he or she contributes to the discussion. Thus, except for 
the working-class participants whose exclusion from the discussion is consistent and 
substantial, lacking consideration was not a serious issue for traditionally marginalized 
groups. Nevertheless and bearing in mind that DP is regarded as the ‘gold standard’ among 
existing mini-publics (Mansbridge, 2010), remaining inequalities and the highly contextual 
nature of small group participation give rise to some concerns and ask for further research on 
group dynamics and the role of facilitators in establishing a fair and equal discussion 
environment.  
Of course, the article is limited in the scope and generalizability of its findings. First of all, the 
sample used in this study was small and results await confirmation from further research.  
Furthermore, the mere focus on equality during the deliberative process is strongly bound to 
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the setting under examination. Recalling that the imperative in DP is learning and 
understanding rather than decision-making (Fung, 2003), a deliberative process has to make 
sure that the relevant reasons are aired and appropriately weighed in order for citizens to 
develop more informed and considered opinions (Mansbridge et al., 2012). In a setting where 
the aim is decision-making, one might also want to place emphasis on the nature of the 
deliberative outcome, for example in terms of inclusiveness, justice, or fairness (e.g., Rawls, 
1971; Sanders, 1997). In the context of DP, future research may want to explore the relation 
between participation patterns and post-deliberative opinions. For example, finding that 
opinions were disproportionally influenced by the dominant participants would render even 
small discrepancies in deliberative participation more important.  
Although this article was limited to the analysis of equality, content and quality of the 
contributions are also important criteria of successful participation in deliberative mini-
publics (e.g., Bächtiger et al., 2010b; Steiner et al., 2004). Future research will need to tell 
whether and to what extent these factors are linked to active participation in deliberative 
discussions.  
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Notes
                                                            
1 But see Olsen and Trenz (2014) for a critical assessment of the representative status of a poll as part of a public 
constituency and as a generator of democratic legitimacy.  
2  As individual participants are embedded in small groups for discussion, multilevel modelling seems the 
appropriate approach (Mendelberg, 2005, pp. 641-642). Note that with N=13, the number of the chosen 
subsample is rather small (but see Gelman and Hill, 2007, p. 247). Nevertheless, there is the danger that using 
maximum likelihood inference, variance components are not properly estimated and estimates and confidence 
intervals can be biased, particularly when cross-level interactions are estimated in models where the number of 
level-2 units is smaller than 15 (Stegmueller 2013). However, by assigning each individual to a particular group 
for discussion, the hierarchical structure in DP is straightforward, allowing for less complex models to be run. In 
order to estimate more complex models, fully Bayesian procedures would be appropriate (e.g., Hangartner et al., 
2007). Where cross-level interactions are estimated, an informal approach to Bayesian inference complements 
the analyses: model simulations are run in order to retrieve an uncertainty distribution of the parameter 
estimates. The multilevel models run in this article are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). 
3 Rater coder agreement RCA=0.79; Cohen’s Kappa ĸ=0.70; Spearman’s r=0.81; Cronbach’s alpha α=0.91 
(N=80).  
4  From a deliberative standpoint, however, receiving disrespectful feedback may be preferable to being 
completely ignored. I thank Michael Neblo for highlighting this point.  
5 One may argue that high centrality values could also just be the result of adherence to a particular argument or 
position as expressed by the following speakers. Thus, the fact that subsequent speakers refer to the first speech 
act may rather reflect convenience than power structures. However, given the nature of the mini-public design 
under scrutiny, these concerns can be countered to some extent. The fact that the general discussions in DP are 
fairly unstructured, participants get the possibility to state their views on a variety of problems, experiences, 
perspectives or policy solutions. In this sense, every participant has the chance to be the first in airing a 
particular aspect of the topic under discussion. Furthermore, the centrality measure of very active participants in 
Europolis is the sum of references received for various contributions.  
6 Furthermore, the sample of our Western European participants is rather homogeneous in that it does neither 
include participants from Ireland or Great Britain nor actual residents from the Nordic countries that are 
generally subsumed under different social welfare models (see Papadopoulus 2012), responses to regular and 
irregular migration (Düvell 2011) as well as attitudes toward immigration (Green 2007).  
7 See Appendix for exact variable description. 
8  Other factors such as conflict avoidance or psychological traits such as openness, extraversion or 
conscientiousness are said to be important antecedents of participation as well (e.g, Mondak and Halperin, 2008; 
Neblo et al., 2010). Yet the Europolis questionnaire did not include measures that encompass such psychological 
constructs. There are very few exceptions included in the questionnaire that could possibly tab single 
characteristics of such traits. However, including these variables would result in the loss of 13 valid 
observations, which is considerable given our small sample. Moreover, running the models including these 
variables does not produce substantive changes for our variables of interest and neither prove the effects of the 
psychological variables to be consistent. Point biserial correlations between the variables of interest and these 
psychological variables were rather low and never surpassed a value of 0.2 (results available on request).  
9 When it comes to age (older participants), attitudes towards immigration and belonging to Southern Europe, 
national heterogeneity did not prove to be an amplifying factor of inequalities. However, there is an almost 
significant interaction effect for working-class participants and the amount of speaking time as well as a 
significant effect for young participants and frequency of participation, but only when deliberating in extremely 
heterogeneous groups (results available on request).  
10 For the models, see Appendix, Table A.3. For more information on the group composition, see Appendix, 
Table A.1 and A.2. 
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11 However, this is only true for the variables of interest. Turning to controls, it becomes evident that although 
interest in politics is a strong driver of participation, it is not an explanatory factor for receiving consideration.  
12 However, we demonstrate elsewhere that the deliberative competence of women and members of new EU-
countries that participated in Europolis does not significantly rank behind their dominating counterparts 
(reference withheld; see also Himmelroos, 2011). The results are different for working-class members: their 
contributions were of lower deliberative quality than those of higher class participants. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Determinants of Contribution (incl. Silent Participants)  
 
Model 1 
Frequency 
Model 2 
Speaking Time 
Fixed effects 
Intercept 
     1.563*** 
(0.166) 
      5.621*** 
(0.245) 
Women 
-0.111 
(0.116) 
  -0.663** 
(0.223) 
Education 
0.013 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.026) 
Working-class 
-0.261+ 
(0.150) 
-0.312 
(0.280) 
Younger participants 
-0.144 
(0.152) 
0.018 
(0.292) 
Older participants 
-0.131 
(0.148) 
0.150 
(0.290) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
-0.054 
(0.182) 
0.111 
(0.320) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
 -0.357 + 
(0.188) 
-0.783 
(0.480) 
Interest in politics 
 0.072* 
(0.030) 
      0.184*** 
(0.056) 
Knowledge 
0.038 
(0.063) 
  0.301* 
(0.127) 
Salience 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
0.073 
(0.146) 
-0.239 
(0.289) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
0.120 
(0.148) 
-0.447 
(0.281) 
National heterogeneity of  small group 
-0.306 
(0.266) 
0.001 
(0.287) 
Random effects   
Individual level  
0.244 
(0.494) 
1.942 
(1.394) 
Group level  
0.385 
(0.148) 
0.770 
(0.877) 
AIC 364.4 655.8 
Log Likelihood -166.2 -311.9 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al., 2011). For contribution 
in speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants is estimated. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as log of the total amount of speaking time. For frequency of 
contribution, a lognormal Poisson model is estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for 
overdispersion (Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables are 
centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01., 
***p<.001. Individual N=173. Group N=13. 
 30 
Table 2: Determinants of Contribution and Consideration (Active Speakers only) 
                          Contribution                    Consideration 
Fixed effects Model 3 Time Model 4 Frequency Model 5 Centrality 
Intercept 
      5.527*** 
(0.415) 
     1.589*** 
(0.160) 
     0.962*** 
(0.152) 
Women 
-0.343* 
(0.158) 
0.001 
(0.106) 
-0.145 
(0.133) 
Education 
0.008 
(0.018) 
0.013 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.014) 
Working-class 
    -0.667*** 
(0.196) 
-0.337* 
(0.136) 
  -0.494** 
(0.181) 
Younger participants 
-0.237 
(0.204) 
 -0.242+ 
(0.139) 
-0.150 
(0.174) 
Older participants 
-0.238 
(0.202) 
 -0.232+ 
(0.134) 
 -0.298 + 
(0.171) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
0.119 
(0.220) 
-0.021 
(0.166) 
-0.307 
(0.203) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.209 
(0.270) 
-0.230 
(0.174) 
-0.185 
(0.201) 
Interest in politics 
    0.108** 
(0.039) 
0.052+ 
(0.027) 
0.006 
(0.034) 
Knowledge 
0.110 
(0.088) 
-0.015 
(0.057) 
0.006 
(0.072) 
Salience 
-0.010 
(0.037) 
-0.014 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.030) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
-0.074 
(0.199) 
0.160  
(0.130) 
0.153 
(0.164) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
-0.048 
(0.200) 
 0.253+ 
(0.135) 
 0.390* 
(0.163) 
National heterogeneity  
0.065 
(0.193) 
-0.279 
(0.271) 
-0.219 
(0.207) 
Random effects    
Individual level  
0.898 
(0.948) 
0.154 
(0.393) 
0.161 
(0.401) 
Group level  
0.133 
(0.365) 
0.166 
(0.407) 
0.047 
(0.217) 
AIC 501.8 301.5 282.5 
Log Likelihood -234.9 -134.8 -125.2 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2011). For contribution in 
speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants is estimated. The 
dependent variable is operationalized as log of the total amount of speaking time. For frequency of 
contribution and consideration, lognormal Poisson models are estimated (varying intercept) in order to 
account for overdispersion (Bolker, 2010; Bates et al., 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor variables 
are centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01., 
***p<.001. Individual N=163. Group N=13. 
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Figure 1: The Effect of Women and CEE Participants on Contribution by National 
Heterogeneity of Small Groups 
 
 
Note: Marginal effect and 95% confidence intervals are based on the hierarchical models presented in Table 
S2-1 in the Appendix S2. The shaded areas demarcate the location of the groups in which CEE participants 
were engaging with participants from older EU-member states (WE, SE, or both). See also Figure S2-1 and 
Figure S2-2 (Appendix S2) for the results of the simulation of the conditional effects. 
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Figure 2: The Effect of Women and CEE Participants on Consideration by National 
Heterogeneity of Small Groups 
  
Note: Marginal effect and 95% confidence intervals are based on the hierarchical models presented in 
Table S2-3 in the Appendix S2. The shaded areas demarcate the location of the groups in which CEE 
participants were engaging with participants from older EU-member states (WE, SE, or both). See also 
Figure S2-3 and S2-4 (Appendix) for the results on the simulation of the conditional effects. 
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Figure 3: Homophily Effects for Members of the Dominant and Peripheral Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: For the corresponding entries to the Figure, see Appendix S3. 
 
  
 34 
Figure 4: Network of Consideration (Group 9) 
 
Note: Attributes display country affiliation. Diamonds are used for CEE participants (Polish), 
triangles for WE participants (Germans and Austrian)). The size of the nodes is given by the in-
degree centrality of an actor (amount of references received from co-discussants). The arrows 
indicate the direction of the reference. Isolates (top left corner) indicate participants that 
contributed to the discussion but neither made a civil reference to someone nor received one. 
Graphs were created using NetDraw (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
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Figure 5: Network of Consideration (Group 1) 
 
Note: Node attributes are shown for gender (men as squares, women as circles). The size of the 
nodes is given by the in-degree centrality of an actor (amount of references received from co-
discussants). The arrows indicate the direction of the reference. Isolates (top left corner) indicate 
participants that contributed to the discussion but neither made a civil reference to someone nor 
received one. Graphs were created using NetDraw (Borgatti et al., 2002). 
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Appendix S1 
Descriptive statistics of selected sample 
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Table S1-1: Group Composition of Selected Sample 
Group 
ID 
Nationalities heterogeneitya N 
1 3 French, 6 Portuguese, 6 Romanians 1.92 15 
2 8 French, 6 Hungarians 0.98 14 
3 2 Belgians (Dutch speaking), 7 Dutch, 6 French 0.62 15 
4 1 Austrian, 6 French, 7 Germans 0.56 14 
9 1 Austrian, 6 Germans, 8 Polish 1.10 15 
10 1 Belgian (French speaking), 6 French, 7 Spanish 1.12 14 
16 9 Polish, 6 Slovenes 0.48 15 
17 1 Austrian, 6 Germans, 8 Spanish 1.10 15 
19 5 Danes, 4 Germans, 7 Spanish 1.30 16 
20 1 Austrian, 5 Germans, 5 Lithuanians, 5 Spanish 2.11 16 
21 1 Austrian, 7 French, 6 Germans, 1 Luxembourger 0.61 15 
23 2 Belgians (Dutch speaking), 5 Dutch, 7 Polish 1.20 14 
24 1 Austrian, 1 Cypriot, 8 Germans, 3 Greeks 1.11 13 
Note: a Index of national heterogeneity of small groups (see Table S1-2). 
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Table S1-2: Variable Description and Comparison of Selected Sample to the Rest of the Groups 
 
Selected Sample 
(N=191) 
Rest 
(N=157) 
 
 
Mean 
(Std.) 
N 
Mean 
(Std.) 
N t-test 
Women  
1=female; 0=male 
0.46 
(0.50) 
191 
0.49 
(0.50) 
157 0.55 
Age  
Year of birth 
1959.4 
(16.67) 
191 
1961.9 
(16.63) 
156 1.41 
Education 
Age in year when main education ended 
20.88 
(4.59) 
171 
19.91 
(4.08) 
133 -1.91+ 
Working-class  
1=yes; 0=no 
0.22 
(0.41) 
187 
0.26 
(0.44) 
155 0.96 
Ideology 
In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. What is your position? Please 
indicate your views using any number on a scale where '0' means ‘left’ and '10' means ‘right’.  
4.91 
(2.72) 
184 
5.32 
(2.52) 
146 1.42 
Salience T2 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is ‘no problem at all’, '10' is ‘the most serious problem we 
face’, and '5' is ‘exactly in the middle’, how serious a problem or not would you say 
immigration is? 
5.72 
(2.40) 
187 
6.61 
(2.47) 
153 3.39*** 
Knowledge T2 
Amount of correct answers to the three knowledge questions on immigration available in the 
questionnaire. The questions asked for the definition of Blue Card workers, the role of the EU in 
the current immigration policy and for a figure of the number of immigrants currently living in 
the EU. For each of the questions, the participants could choose out of four possible options and 
an additional ‘don’t know’ category. 
1.07 
(0.89) 
191 
1.02 
(0.92) 
157 -0.56 
Interest in politics T2 
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' is ‘not at all’, '10' is ‘passionately’, and '5' is ‘exactly in the 
middle’, how interested or not would you say you generally are in politics? 
6.48 
(2.22) 
188 
6.19 
(2.53) 
155 -1.11 
 39 
Attitude scale on immigration T2  
This variable has been built as a scale from five central questions on immigration that proved to 
be substantially related in a test of inter-item correlation (α=0.76). The questions ask for 
participants’ opinions on regularization/sending back irregular immigrants, reinforcing border 
controls, imposing penalties on employers who hire irregular immigrants, whether immigration 
increases criminality, and whether amnesty given to irregular immigrants will increase irregular 
immigration. The (standardised) scale has been generated automatically via the inter-item 
correlation command in Stata. The scale ranges from -1.27 to 2.17 with lower values indicating 
more conservative views on immigration. 
0.06 
(0.05) 
191 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
156 1.66+ 
National heterogeneity of small group 
This measure is based on the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalisation Index (ELF) (Fearon and Laitin 
2003). ELF= 1-Σsi
2 where si is the share of group i out of a total of n groups (here: nationalities). 
The ELF scores have been weighed by a factor of 3 for groups that incorporated members from 
all three regions (WE, SE, and CEE), by a factor of 2 for groups that incorporated members 
from two out of the three regions, and by a factor of 1 when only one region was represented in 
the group. The group scores range from 0.48 to 2.11, with higher values indicating more 
heterogeneous groups. The most homogeneous and the most heterogeneous groups are part of 
the selected sample. 
1.10 
(0.48) 
191 
1.25 
(0.37) 
157 3.36*** 
Note: All variables (except ‘national heterogeneity’) are retrieved from the Europolis questionnaire dataset. T2 indicate questionnaire responses right at 
the start of the three-day event in Brussels, T3 indicate questionnaire responses right at the end of the three-day event. a For the sake of interpretability, the 
poles of the original question have been exchanged in this paper. This is the reversed version of the question. T-test: +p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
***p<0.001. For a comparison between test- and control-group, visit http://ccd.stanford.edu.  
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Appendix S2 
Models with cross-level interactions (including 
simulated effects) 
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Table S2-1: Determinants of Contribution (incl. Cross-Level Interaction)  
 Speaking Time Frequency 
 Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A4 
Intercept 
     5.596*** 
(0.244) 
     5.642*** 
(0.251) 
     1.550*** 
(0.165) 
     1.550*** 
(0.160) 
Women 
  -0.678** 
(0.223) 
  -0.657** 
(0.225) 
-0.120 
(0.116) 
-0.114 
(0.117) 
Education 
0.019 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.026) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
Working-class 
-0.327 
(0.279) 
-0.289 
(0.284) 
-0.267+ 
(0.149) 
-0.247 
(0.151) 
Younger participants 
0.044 
(0.291) 
-0.002 
(0.292) 
-0.134 
(0.151) 
-0.154 
(0.153) 
Older participants 
0.184 
(0.290) 
0.155 
(0.291) 
-0.118 
(0.148) 
-0.142 
(0.150) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
0.109 
(0.319) 
0.041 
(0.362) 
-0.062 
(0.181) 
-0.090 
(0.226) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.724 
(0.450) 
-0.714+ 
(0.379) 
-0.342+ 
(0.187) 
-0.276 
(0.190) 
Interest in politics 
     0.190*** 
(0.056) 
    0.177** 
(0.056) 
0.075* 
(0.030) 
 0.070* 
(0.030) 
Knowledge 
0.294* 
(0.126) 
0.315* 
(0.126) 
0.039 
(0.063) 
0.040 
(0.064) 
Salience 
-0.003 
(0.053) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.027) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
-0.202 
(0.288) 
-0.260 
(0.291) 
0.090 
(0.146) 
0.056 
(0.147) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
-0.434 
(0.280) 
-0.441 
(0.285) 
0.136 
(0.148) 
0.122 
(0.152) 
National heterogeneity of SG 
0.329 
(0.356) 
0.181 
(0.350) 
-0.163 
(0.284) 
-0.138 
(0.289) 
Heterogeneity x women 
-0.759 
(0.466)  
-0.334 
(0.261)  
Heterogeneity x CEE 
 
 -1.372* 
(0.69)  
-0.555 
(0.432) 
Heterogeneity x SE 
 
-0.049 
(0.728)  
-0.062 
(0.467) 
Random effects     
Individual level  
1.931 
(1.390) 
1.960 
(1.400) 
0.241 
(0.491) 
0.251 
(0.501) 
Group level  
0.610 
(0.781) 
0.284 
(0.532) 
0.144 
(0.380) 
0.117 
(0.342) 
AIC 654.9 654.2 364.8 366.8 
Log Likelihood -310.4 -309.1 -165.4 -165.4 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2011). For 
contribution in speaking time, a linear hierarchical model with varying slopes for CEE participants 
is estimated. The dependent variable is operationalised as log of the total amount of speaking time. 
For frequency of contribution, a lognormal Poisson model is estimated (varying intercept) in order 
to account for overdispersion (Bolker 2010; Bates et al. 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor 
variables are centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. +p<0.1, 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001. Individual N=173. Group N=13. 
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Table S2-2: Determinants of Consideration (incl. Cross-Level Interaction)  
 Model A5 Model A6 
Intercept 
      0.940*** 
(0.153) 
      0.937*** 
(0.151) 
Women 
-0.172 
(0.133) 
-0.135 
(0.134) 
Education 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
Working-class 
   -0.505** 
(0.179) 
   -0.488** 
(0.181) 
Younger participants 
-0.148 
(0.172) 
-0.144 
(0.175) 
Older participants 
-0.266 
(0.168) 
 -0.304+ 
(0.172) 
Southern Europeans (SE) 
-0.312 
(0.201) 
 -0.469+ 
(0.247) 
Central Eastern Europeans (CEE) 
-0.186 
(0.201) 
-0.180 
(0.202) 
Interest in politics 
0.014 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.035) 
Knowledge 
0.011 
(0.071) 
0.010 
(0.072) 
Salience 
-0.018 
(0.030) 
-0.014 
(0.031) 
Attitudes (strongly progressive) 
0.195 
(0.162) 
0.148 
(0.164) 
Attitudes (strongly conservative) 
    0.432** 
(0.161) 
    0.434** 
(0.168) 
National heterogeneity of SG 
0.026 
(0.240) 
-0.137 
(0.243) 
Heterogeneity x women 
 -0.685* 
(0.320)  
Heterogeneity x CEE  
-0.518 
(0.432) 
Heterogeneity x SE  
0.422 
(0.517) 
Random effects   
Individual level  
0.141 
(0.376) 
0.164 
(0.405) 
Group level  
0.056 
(0.237) 
0.033 
(0.182) 
AIC 279.8 283.8 
Log Likelihood -122.9 -123.9 
Notes: Multilevel models are estimated with the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2011). 
Lognormal Poisson models are estimated (varying intercept) in order to account for 
overdispersion (Bolker 2010; Bates et al. 2011). All ordinal and continuous predictor 
variables are centered at the mean. Estimated standard errors are shown in parentheses. 
+p<0.1, *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<.001. Individual N=163. Group N=13. 
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Figure S2-1: Simulated Effect of Women on Contribution at Different Levels of National 
Heterogeneity 
 
 
Note: Simulations are based on the statistical models presented in Table A3. The models were 
simulated in R (1000 draws). The first row shows the frequency distribution of the simulations for 
total amount of speaking time (Model A1), and the second row shows the distribution of the 
simulations for frequency of contribution (Model A3). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference 
in contribution that is attributed to the effect of being female, at the corresponding level of national 
heterogeneity and by holding all other factors constant.  
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Figure S2-2: Simulated Effect of CEE Participants on Contribution at Different Levels 
of National Heterogeneity 
 
 
Note: Simulations are based on the statistical models presented in Table S2-1. The models were 
simulated in R (1000 draws). The first row shows the frequency distribution of the simulations for 
total amount of speaking time (Model A2), and the second row shows the distribution of the 
simulations for frequency of contribution (Model A4). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference 
in contribution that is attributed to the effect of belonging to a CEE member state (compared to 
belonging to a WE member state), at the corresponding levels of national heterogeneity and by 
holding all other factors constant. Note that the minimum, mean and maximum value of national 
heterogeneity have been recalculated. Calculations solely base on the groups in which CEE 
participants were engaging with participants from WE and/or SE member states.  
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Figure S2-3: Simulated Effect of Women on Consideration at Different Levels of 
National Heterogeneity 
 
Note: Simulations are based on Model A5 presented in Table S2-2. The model was simulated in R 
(1000 draws). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in consideration that is attributed to the 
effect of being female, at the corresponding level of national heterogeneity and by holding all other 
factors constant.  
 
Figure S2-4: Simulated Effect of CEE Participants on Consideration at Different Levels 
of National Heterogeneity 
 
Note: Simulations are based on Model A6 presented in Table S2-2. The model was simulated in R 
(1000 draws). The x-axis indicates the percentage difference in consideration that is attributed to the 
effect of belonging to a CEE member state (compared to belonging to a WE member state), at the 
corresponding levels of national heterogeneity of the group discussions and by holding all other 
factors constant. Note that the minimum, mean and maximum value of national heterogeneity have 
been recalculated: new calculations solely base on the groups in which CEE participants were 
engaging with participants from WE and/or SE member states. 
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Appendix S3 
Network densities per group 
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Table S3-1: Network Densities of Consideration (Gender) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group  
references 
Percentage point 
difference between within-
and between-group  
 Men to Men 
Women to 
Women 
Men to 
Women 
Women to 
Men 
Men Women 
1 0.264 0.000 0.139 0.083 12.5 -8.3 
2 0.286 0.107 0.125 0.143 16.1 -3.6 
3 0.125 0.200 0.200 0.067 -7.5 13.3 
4 0.304 0.100 0.208 0.229 9.6 -12.9 
9 0.429 0.200 0.238 0.429 19.1 -22.9 
10 0.214 0.119 0.204 0.143 1.0 -2.4 
16 0.181 0.583 0.306 0.250 -12.5 33.3 
17 0.179 0.119 0.143 0.143 3.6 -2.4 
19 0.167 0.119 0.159 0.127 0.8 -0.8 
20 0.119 0.067 0.024 0.071 9.5 -0.4 
21 0.300 0.139 0.244 0.200 5.6 -6.1 
23 0.222 0.250 0.111 0.267 11.1 -1.7 
24 0.300 0.200 0.194 0.222 10.6 -2.2 
Note: Entries are to be read as percentages. In group 21, for example, 30% of all possible references 
between men were made. In the same group, men referenced women in 24.4% of possible cases. This 
results in a slight tendency for homophily (5.6 percentage point difference). The last two columns are 
the entries of Figure 3.  
 
Table S3-2: Network Densities of Consideration (Working-class) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group references 
Percentage point 
difference between within-
and between-group  
 NW to NW W to W NW to W W to NW NW W 
1 0.155 0.000 0.182 0.273 -2.7 -27.3 
2 0.220 0.000 0.028 0.083 19.2 -8.3 
3 0.152 0.000 0.083 0.125 6.9 -12.5 
4  ---  ---  ---  --- --- --- 
9 0.417 0.250 0.250 0.278 16.7 -2.8 
10 0.173 0.000 0.242 0.121 -6.9 -12.1 
16 0.378 0.000 0.100 0.100 27.8 -10 
17 0.189 0.000 0.056 0.111 13.3 -11.1 
19 0.200 0.150 0.109 0.073 9.1 7.7 
20 0.054 0.050 0.075 0.100 -2.1 -5.0 
21 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
23 0.179 0.267 0.188 0.229 -0.9 3.8 
24 0.300 0.000 0.050 0.100 25.0 -10 
Note: See note in Table S3-1 for an example. NW=Non working-class participants; W=working-class 
participants. Due to the lack of working-class participants in group 4 (only one W) and group 21 (no 
W), no consideration densities were calculated for the respective small group discussions. The last two 
columns are the entries of Figure 3. 
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Table S3-3: Network Densities of Consideration (New CEE Members) 
Group 
ID 
Within-group  
references 
Between-group references 
Percentage point 
difference between within-
and between-group  
 old to old new to new old to new new to old old new 
1 0.167 0.250 0.136 0.194 3.1 5.6 
2 0.179 0.071 0.179 0.179 0.0 -10.8 
9 0.690 0.167 0.190 0.238 50.0 -7.1 
20 0.089 0.167 0.033 0.033 5.6 13.4 
23 0.429 0.095 0.143 0.184 28.6 -8.9 
Note: See note in Table S3-1 for an example. new=participants from a new CEE member state; 
old=participants from an older member state (SE and/or WE). The last two columns are the entries of 
Figure 3. 
 
 
